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Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver
Versus Narrow Waiver of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
After Jaffee v. Redmond
by
ELLEN E. MCDONNELL*

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond'
expressly recognized a federal testimonial privilege protecting
communications between a psychotherapist and a patient occurring
during the course of diagnosis or treatment. The Court stressed that
mental health is essential to public welfare and found that the
privilege is necessary to ensure the atmosphere of confidence critical
for a trusting psychotherapist-patient relationship.
In the wake of Jaffee, there have been various inconsistencies in
the federal courts' interpretation of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. One such inconsistency is in the area of waiver. The
Supreme Court never addressed whether the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is waived by a plaintiff who places her medical condition at
issue. Since Jaffee, federal courts have been divided as to when the
bringing of a lawsuit results in the waiver of psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
Post-Jaffee courts have recognized that a plaintiff waives the
privilege when she places her mental condition at issue in the
litigation. However, courts vary in their determination of when a
plaintiff has placed her mental condition at issue. This Note will
explore the split among federal district courts regarding waiver of the
* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A., Florida Atlantic University, 1996.
I would like to extend many thanks to my parents for their support; and also to Craig,
Amy, Liz and Cecillia for their encouragement.
1. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil cases where a plaintiff claims
emotional damages.
Two strands of waiver cases have emerged among the federal
courts, broad waiver cases and narrow waiver cases. Broad waiver
cases hold that a patient waives her privilege by merely asserting a
claim for emotional damages. 2 Conversely, narrow waiver cases hold
that a plaintiff must make affirmative use of the privileged
information and put the substance of her communications at issue in
order to waive her privilege. 3 Given the inconsistent application of
the waiver doctrine among the federal courts, the resulting
uncertainty will cause open communications within the
psychotherapist-patient relationship to suffer.
Part I of this Note provides background information regarding
the concepts of privilege and waiver. Part II explains the Supreme
Court's ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond. Part III details the two strands
of waiver cases after Jaffee. Part IV discusses a plaintiff's dilemma in
light of these post-Jaffee rulings. Part V explores how this
inconsistency affects the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
I. Background
A testimonial privilege is "a rule that gives a person a right to
refuse to disclose information to a tribunal that would otherwise be
entitled to demand and make use of that information in performing
its assigned function."' 4 By definition, privileges exclude from trial
otherwise relevant information.5 In cases where a party asserts her
privilege, the relevance of the privileged information alone is not
6
sufficient to deprive that party of her privilege.
7
Although the general rule disfavors testimonial privileges,
exceptions to this rule are recognized where there is a "public good
2. See, e.g., Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
that plaintiff waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by relying on a mental disability
to support her Americans with Disabilities Act claim).
3. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding
that all information regarding the plaintiff's psychotherapy was privileged as long as she
continued to allege ordinary emotional damages within a layperson's sphere of knowledge
and was not making assertive use of the privileged material).
4. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422 (1980).

5. See Matter of Grand Jury Proceeding, Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that attorney-client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the fact finder).
6. Id.
7. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940) (stating that
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transcending the normally predominate principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth."8 In Jaffee v. Redmond, the
Supreme Court recognized mental health as such a public good.9 The

Court found that, like the spousal and attorney-client relationships,
the psychotherapist-patient relationship should be protected. 10
Like any other testimonial privilege, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege can be waived." The Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond

did not elaborate on the scope of waiver for the psychotherapistpatient privilege. As a result, post-Jaffee courts have analogized to
the well-established doctrine of waiver in attorney-client privilege

cases.

Specifically, under the

waiver doctrine at issue, "a party

waives his privilege if he affirmatively pleads a claim or defense that
places at issue the subject matter of privileged material over which he

has control.' 2 For an at issue waiver, the pleadings must place the
underlying subject matter of the privileged communications under
consideration. 13 In these cases, the privilege holder must be forced to
14
make use of the privileged communications in asserting her claim.

H. Jaffee v. Redmond
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme

Court established

a

psychotherapist-patient privilege, finding that psychotherapy serves
"a public good of transcendent importance."' 15 Jaffee held that
confidential communications between a patient and a licensed

generally one has a duty to give evidence he is capable of giving and any deviations from
this rule are considered distinctly exceptional).
8. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) (modifying spousal privilege).
9. 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
10. It.at 10.
11. Id. at 15 n.14.
12. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450,
1637 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (citing examples of waiver in attorney-client
privilege cases); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1605, 1627-29 (1986) (exploring at issue waiver in attorneyclient privilege cases).
13. Developments, Supranote 12, at 1638.
14. Id.
15. 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). The Court's view was supported by the fact that all fifty
states plus the District of Columbia had some version of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Id.at 12.
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psychotherapist, 16 during the course of diagnosis or treatment, are
privileged and protected from discovery. 17
The Court employed Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 501,
which authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by
interpreting "principles of common law ... in the light of reason and
experience. 18 Reason and experience led the Court to conclude that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege exists under FRE 501.19
In Jaffee, the first officer to respond to a call involving a fight,
shot and killed Ricky Allen. 20 Officer Redmond shot Allen because
2
she believed he was about to stab another man with a butcher knife. 1
As a result of this traumatic incident, Officer Redmond participated
in approximately 50 counseling sessions with a state-licensed social
22
worker.
Petitioner Jaffee, the administrator of Allen's estate, brought a
constitutional claim against the officer for excessive force. 23 Jaffee
requested production of the social worker's notes from her counseling
sessions with Officer Redmond in order to use these notes in crossexamination. 24 Although Redmond and her psychotherapist asserted
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and "vigorously resisted the
25
discovery," the trial court ordered that the notes be disclosed.
After Redmond and her psychotherapist refused discovery of the
notes, the trial court instructed the jury that they could presume the
contents of the notes to be unfavorable to Redmond. 26 Jaffee was

16. Id. at 15. It is clear, that the Court's ruling in Jaffee applies to individual
psychotherapy conducted with adult patients by a licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, or
social worker. Id. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court extended that privilege to sessions with a
clinical social worker. Id.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. FED. R. EVID. 501. Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE")
without a specific provision recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege. FED. R.
EVID. 501. Because FRE 501 was not specific on its face, courts adopted differing
approaches to psychotherapist-patient claims before Jaffee. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An
Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive
Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the ContextualSynthesis, 73 NEB. L. REv. 511, 517-23
(1994) (detailing the development, drafting and adoption of the Rules).
19. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. Jaffee sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as the Illinois wrongful
death statute. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 5-6.
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awarded a total judgment of $545,000 against Officer Redmond. 27
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,
concluding that FRE 501 compelled recognition of a psychotherapistpatient privilege.28
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the
existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and employed a
balancing test to determine whether the privilege would apply in this
case.29 The privilege would not apply if "in the interests of justice, the
evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of a patient's
counseling sessions outweighs [the] patient's privacy interests. ' 30 The
court of appeals determined that Officer Redmond's privacy interest
31
outweighed Jaffee's evidentiary need for the notes.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals, holding
between a
communications
confidential
that protecting
outweighs
a
critical
interest
and
psychotherapist and patient promotes
the need for probative evidence. However, the Court rejected the
lower court's balancing test.32 The Court reasoned that: "[m]aking
the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the
effectiveness of the privilege. '33 The Supreme Court feared that use
of a balancing test would frustrate the aim of the privilege by making
its application uncertain.34
The Jaffee decision was grounded in the belief that "[t]he mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public
good of transcendent importance. ' 35 The Court acknowledged that
the psychotherapist-patient relationship is contingent on a completely
secure in
trusting environment in which the patient feels at ease and 36
the notion that personal disclosures will be kept confidential.

27. Id.at 6.
28. Id.
29. 1& at 7.
30. Id.
31. Id. The court observed that the evidentiary need for the content of the confidential
communications was diminished in this case because of the many eyewitnesses to the
shooting. Id. The court also emphasized the fact that Officer Redmond had substantial
privacy interests in this case. Id.
32 Id at 17. This balancing test was employed by the Seventh Circuit in Jaffee v.
Redmond and by a small number of states. Id.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id at 10.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

Without the privilege, the Court recognized that psychotherapistpatient relationships would become alienated and consist of tightlipped communications, particularly when the circumstances creating
the need for treatment will likely result in litigation.37 The Court
noted that, in order for the privilege to be effective, a psychotherapist
and her patient "must be able to predict with some degree of
'38
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.
The Jaffee opinion did not describe the scope of the privilege,
recognizing the impracticality of discerning guidelines that would
govern all possible future inquiries in the area. 39 The Court briefly
mentioned the fact that the patient may waive this privilege, like
other testimonial privileges, but did not further address or specify the
issue of waiver.40
The Jaffee Court also mentioned the fact that the privilege would
yield under some circumstances. 41 In a footnote, Justice Stevens
stated, "[w]e do not doubt that there are situations in which the
privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by
the therapist." 42
In fact, the Court left many aspects of the privilege unresolved.
Ironically, many psychotherapists hailed Jaffee v. Redmond as a
decision that would standardize psychotherapist-patient privilege in
federal courts. 43 Much to the contrary, Jaffee led to litigation that
threatens to undermine the privilege by creating inconsistent
applications. 44
As a result of the Supreme Court's limited guidance regarding
when the psychotherapist-patient privilege should give way, lower
courts were left to interpret when waiver occurs. Unfortunately,
federal courts after Jaffee have inconsistently interpreted waiver.
Two strands of post-Jaffee waiver cases have developed, those
holding that the mere assertion of a claim for emotional distress

37. Id. at 11-12.
38. Id. at 18 (citing Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S 383,.393 (1981)).
39. Id at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386).
40. Id. at 15 n.14.
41. Id. at 18 n.19.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Camille DeBell & R. Deniece Jones, Privileged Communication at Last?
An Overview of Jaffee v. Redmond, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC. 559, 562
(1997).
44. M. Brett Fulkerson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back The Recognized But
UndefinedFederalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 62 Mo. L. REv. 401,423-24 (1997).
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constitutes a waiver ("broad waiver"), 45 and those holding that the

privilege is not waived unless the plaintiff makes affirmative use of
the privileged material ("narrow waiver"). 46
The Jaffee opinion stressed, above all, the need for certainty in
The Court explicitly
the psychotherapist-patient relationship 4 7

rejected a case-by-case approach in the area of psychotherapistpatient privilege and acknowledged that inconsistent interpretations
of the privilege would erode its effectiveness. 48 The present
inconsistency in lower court rulings fosters uncertainty as to the status
of the privilege and thwarts the Supreme Court's objective 49

I. Post-Jaffee Cases Interpreting Waiver
Federal courts after Jaffee agree that a plaintiff waives her
psychotherapist-patient privilege when she places her mental
condition at issue during litigation.50 However, courts vary in their
determination of when a plaintiff has placed her mental condition at
issue.
Broad waiver cases hold that a plaintiff places her mental state at
issue and waives her psychotherapist-patient privilege solely by
claiming emotional distress damages. 51 Many of these cases rely on

the holdings of pre-Jaffee precedent in finding waiver. Broad waiver
courts balance the relevancy of the privileged information against the
plaintiff's right to confidentiality and generally find that the
privileged information must be disclosed. These courts disregard the
Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee that protecting confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
outweighs the need for otherwise relevant evidence.
Narrow waiver cases, in contrast, hold that a plaintiff places her
mental state at issue and waives her privilege only when the substance

45. See, e.g., Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
46. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
47. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
48. Id. at 17-18.
49. See id
50. Although the majority of cases involving waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege involve a waiver on the part of a plaintiff, and not by a defendant, the analysis is
similar. See Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1120 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that officer waived privilege with respect to certain records related to his
defense of perception distortion). In cases where a defendant may have waived her
privilege, the court must determine whether the defendant placed her mental state at issue
by raising her mental state as a defense. See id.
51. See, e.g., Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127,130 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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of therapist communication is affirmatively used.52 Narrow waiver
cases attribute to Jaffee the creation of a fundamental change in the
waiver formula. These cases cite the social importance of the policy
behind Jaffee, conceding that by their nature, evidentiary privileges
sometimes result in the sacrifice of otherwise admissible evidence.
Narrow waiver cases stress that testimonial privileges often require a
sacrifice and strictly follow Jaffee's mandate against a balancing of the
respective interests.
The narrow waiver interpretation highlights the fact that the
Supreme Court's example of where the psychotherapist-patient
privilege would give way is extreme. As an example of when the
privilege would give way, the Jaffee Court mentioned an instance
53
which presented a threat of harm to the patient or another person.
Narrow waiver courts point to the extremity of this scenario and cite
the supportive language in Jaffee to hold that waiver should not be
found freely.
A. Broad Waiver Cases

Since Jaffee, the majority of courts have held that by bringing a
claim for mental or emotional distress, a plaintiff places her mental
state at issue and automatically waives her psychotherapist-patient
privilege as to all confidential communications regarding the mental
state at issue in the litigation. 54 In the first broad waiver case, Sarko
v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,55 the court held that the plaintiff waived
her psychotherapist-patient privilege by relying on a mental disability
56
to support her Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claim.
In that case, plaintiff was a former employee of the defendant
who claimed, under the ADA, that she suffered from depression and
that her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her.57 Plaintiff
alleged that defendant employer terminated her, despite his
awareness that she suffered from clinical depression. 8 The court

52 See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225,230 (D. Mass. 1997).
53. See Alexandra P. West, Comment, Implying Plaintiffs' Waivers of the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege after Jaffee v. Redmond, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 901, 905
(1998) (arguing that "the absolute nature of the privilege suggests that waiver should not
be found lightly").
54. See, e.g., Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (examining post-Jaffee cases on waiver of
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
55. 170 F.R.D. at 128.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 129.
58. Id.
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pre-Jaffee precedent and by considering
found waiver by relying on
59
fairness to the defendant.
The court cited several reasons for holding that the plaintiff had
waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental
condition at issue. 60 First, Sarko considered pre-Jaffee precedent on
at-issue waiver; finding that Jaffee had not changed the waiver
analysis.61 Next, Sarko employed the analogy to attorney-client
privilege suggested in Jaffee.62 Sarko observed that the attorneyclient privilege is waived when the advice of counsel is placed at issue
in litigation. 63 Finally, Sarko cited fairness concerns, stating that
"allowing a plaintiff 'to hide ... behind a claim of privilege when that

simply be contrary
condition is placed directly at issue in a case would
'64
justice."
and
fairness
of
sense
to the most basic
Sarko held that the plaintiff must release "all records that
contain confidential communications with her psychiatrist that are
relevant to her mental condition during the time she was in
Defendant's employ. '65 In Sarko, given the fact that the plaintiff's
claim was founded on a specific medical condition, proving her claim
probably would have required the testimony of her therapist or of an
expert. Thus, a narrow waiver court would likely have reached a
similar result under these facts.
In Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon,66 the plaintiff
automatically waived her privilege by planning to call her therapist as
a witness at trial. 67 Like Vann, many other courts, both broad waiver
and narrow waiver, have held that when a plaintiff calls her therapist
as a witness at trial, this constitutes an automatic waiver of her
privilege. 68 Vann followed the formula set by Sarko for finding atissue waiver.69 In Vann, a sexual harassment action under Title VII,
59. Id. at 130.
60. Id. The court held that the plaintiff had placed her mental condition "directly at
issue" when she claimed that her clinical depression qualified her for coverage under the
ADA. Id61. Id. (citing Topol v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476,477 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).
6Z Id.
63. Id. (citing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1995)).
64. Id. (quoting Premack v. J.C.J. Ogar, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 140,145 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
65. Id.
66. 967 F. Supp. 346 (C.D. Il. 1997).
67. Id. at 349.
68. See generally Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal.
2000); Adams v. Ardcory, 196 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Doe v. City of Chula Vista,
196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999); EEOC v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo.
1997); Doolittle v. Ruffo, 1997 WL 151799 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,1997).
69. 967 F. Supp. at 349.
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the plaintiff alleged that her former employer "engaged in offensive
and unwelcome touching and made sexually suggestive comments to
Vann and other female employees. '70 The plaintiff claimed that she
lost her job and suffered both physical and emotional injury as a
71
result of the general manager's conduct.
Plaintiff planned to call her psychotherapist as an expert witness
who would testify as to her psychological response to the events
surrounding plaintiffs claim. 72 Thus, like the Sarko decision, the
Vann decision reached the same result that a court employing a
narrow waiver approach would have reached in this case. However,
the court here relied on pre-Jaffee precedent and the Sarko decision
73
in reaching its ruling.
In Sidor v. Reno,74 the court employed the broad waiver
approach to hold that the plaintiff waived her privilege merely by
filing an emotional distress claim.75 In finding waiver, the Sidor court
stressed that the confidential information would be relevant and
helpful to the defendant. 76 Here, the plaintiff argued that her
employer, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") discriminated
against her because she was deaf.77 The FBI requested disclosure of
the plaintiff's treatment records from her former psychologist.7 8
Plaintiff contended that because she did not intend to call her
therapist as a witness or make affirmative use of her therapist's
records, she had not waived the privilege.79 The FBI, on the other
hand, argued that Ms. Sidor waived the privilege simply by claiming
emotional distress. 80
The Sidor court agreed with the FBI, finding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege had been waived because the
plaintiff's mental state was central to the events leading to the
litigation. 81 The court's primary justification for finding waiver here
was fairness to the defendant. Specifically, the court felt that it was

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 347-48
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349-50.
No. 95 CIV. 9588 (KMW), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
Id. at *4-7. Plaintiff brought an action under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at *4-7.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2
Id.
I& at *5.

"1.
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inequitable to deny the FBI an opportunity to inquire into Ms. Sidor's
past to show alternative causes for her emotional distress. 82 Unlike
Sarko and Vann, a narrow waiver court in Sidor would not have
found that the plaintiff here placed her mental state at issue and
waived her privilege.
The court in McKenna v. Cruz83 followed the reasoning of other
broad waiver courts in holding that the mere assertion of a claim for
emotional distress constitutes a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 84 In this civil rights action, the plaintiff alleged that he was
85
the victim of an illegal arrest and was subjected to excessive force.
The plaintiff claimed recovery for "serious and possibly permanent
'86
emotional injuries and grievous mental and emotional distress.
McKenna highlighted the fact that the plaintiff was diagnosed as
suffering from a "specific, diagnosable mental condition"-- posttraumatic stress syndrome.87 However, the specificity of the plaintiff's
diagnosis was not central to the court's reasoning; the court held that
the plaintiff waived his privilege by merely claiming emotional
distress.88
In keeping with other broad waiver courts, the McKenna court
reasoned that even if the plaintiff were to seek damages solely for
general emotional anxiety, he would still have waived his
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 89 Plaintiff here argued for a narrow
waiver approach. The court responded that allowing waiver to hinge
on the distinction between "garden variety" and "non-garden variety"
claims "would reintroduce the very uncertainty the Supreme Court
eliminated" in Jaffee.90

Although joining the broad waiver courts, the Jackson court
waiver formula leaves plaintiffs with an
conceded that a broad
"unenviable choice." 91 Here, the court found that the plaintiff had
82. Id at *4-5.
83. No. 98 CIV. 1853 (BB) (HBP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18293 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19,
1998).
84. Id at *5. The court relies on the holdings of the following broad waiver cases: Fox
v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303 (D. Colo. 1998); Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 CIV. 9588 (KMW),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-CV-1175,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4021 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997); Kerman v. City of New York, No.
96 CIV. 7865 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16841 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997).
85. McKenna, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18293 at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *5
88. See id. at *5-6.
89. Id. at *5.
90. Id at *6.
91. Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216,226 (D.NJ. 2000).
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waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege with regard to her
mental health records by asserting claims of emotional distress that
went beyond "garden variety" anxiety to include a diagnosis of severe
depression. 92 As the court described it, plaintiffs face the "Hobson's
choice" of either continuing to receive "unfettered psychotherapy" or
retaining the right to claim damages for continuing distress. 93
However, despite these considerations, the Jackson court still
found that it would "prove more inequitable to permit a plaintiff to
recover damages for a claim based upon selective disclosure, and bar
a defendant from gathering the necessary evidence with which to
present a defense. '94 The court added that even under the narrow
waiver analysis, the plaintiff in this case would have waived her
privilege because she intended to use the privileged communications
95
as evidence.
In a recent broad waiver case, the court presented the plaintiffs
with a "Hobson's choice" similar to that articulated in Jackson. In
Sanchez v. U.S. Airways Inc.,96 the court held that the plaintiffs placed
their emotional state at issue, thus waiving their privilege by claiming
emotional distress damages related to plaintiffs' alleged wrongful
97
termination.
The court advised plaintiffs that they could avoid disclosure of
records regarding their treatment if they withdrew their claims for
emotional distress.9 8 In reaching its holding, the court balanced the
defendant's interest in fighting the claim against plaintiffs' privacy
interest in their therapeutic records. 99 Like- other broad waiver
courts, the Sanchez court disregards the Supreme Court's mandate in
Jaffee that an individual's interest in her privilege not be balanced
away.
One broad waiver court acknowledged that possible damage to
the psychotherapist-patient relationship should not be ignored, even
in cases where a plaintiff puts her mental state at issue. This court
restricted the extent of a plaintiff's waiver in light of policy concerns
about the effect that a plaintiff's disclosures may have on her

92. Id. at 225 n.8, 226.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 227.
96. 2001 WL 311271 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2001) .
97. Id. at *4 (plaintiff alleging that he and his wife (co-plaintiff) suffered significant
emotional distress related to his termination by defendant employer).
98. Id. at *4.
99. 1& at *34
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psychotherapist-patient relationship. In Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l
Inc.,1°° the plaintiff claimed that she was assaulted by a co-worker
while attending a company meeting. 1 1 Plaintiff claimed damages for
emotional injuries and severe emotional distress. 10 2
Under a broad waiver analysis, the court found that plaintiff had
placed her mental state at issue by claiming emotional distress
damages and had waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege. 10 3
However, the court considered the fact that the plaintiff had "raised
serious concerns that the disclosures will adversely affect her
psychiatric treatment by destroying the confidentiality .. ."104 As a
result, the court limited discovery to information that was directly
relevant to the lawsuit. 05 The court granted plaintiff's motion to
quash the subpoena on the grounds that the defendant's request was
overbroad. 106
The Vasconcellos court advised defendants that they might bring
a more narrowly tailored subpoena, but noted that they may not
engage in a "fishing expedition."'1 7 The court also pointed out the
existence of "less intrusive means" for the defendants to obtain the
necessary information 0 8 Unlike other broad waiver courts, the
Vasconcellos court recognized the important policy concerns
articulated in the Jaffee decision and worked to minimize intrusion
into the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
B. Narrow Waiver Cases

A minority of courts employ the narrow waiver approach,
holding that a plaintiff does not waive her psychotherapist-patient
privilege unless she directly places the privileged communication at
issue.10 9 For narrow waiver courts, a plaintiff does not place her
mental state at issue solely by claiming emotional damages. Courts

100. 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1997).
101. Id at 703.
102- Id at 708.
103. Id at 708-09.
104. Id (emphasizing that given the important public policy behind the privilege, the
plaintiff's concern that the requested disclosures may adversely affect her psychotherapistpatient relationship is an important consideration for the court).
105. Id at 709.
106. Id
107. Id (citing Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216,223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
108. Vasconcellos, 962 F. Supp.at 709 (plaintiff in this case had offered to undergo a
psychiatric evaluation).
109. Speaker v. County of San Bernadino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(examining post-Jaffee case on waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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employing a narrow waiver analysis stress that the doctrine of waiver
should be consistent with the spirit of the Supreme Court in the Jaffee
decision.
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark" was the first case to reject the
Sarko broad waiver approach and to recognize that "Jaffee's 'no
balancing' instruction drastically changes the waiver formula.""' The
court in Vanderbiltfound that a plaintiff does not automatically waive
her privilege when she alleges ordinary emotional damages within a
layperson's sphere of knowledge, as long as that claimant is not
2
offering her therapist's record or testimony."
In Vanderbilt, a discrimination case, the court denied the
defendant's motion to compel plaintiff's therapeutic records and to
depose any mental health professionals who had treated the
plaintiff." 3 The Vanderbilt court held that all information regarding
the substance of plaintiff's psychiatric care, counseling, and
psychotherapy were privileged." 4 Vanderbilt found that a plaintiff
who claims emotional damages has merely made her confidential
communication "potentially relevant." ' s
Here, the plaintiff was not introducing any evidence regarding
the substance of her conversations with her therapist to bolster her
emotional damages claim. 116 The court analogized to the attorneyclient privilege, which is also subject to waiver if a client places the
attorney-client privilege at issue. The court presented an example of
waiver in attorney-client privilege cases, which occurs when a client
uses reliance on her attorney's advice as a defense, or when a client
sues an attorney for malpractice." 7 However, as the Vanderbilt court
noted, a client does not place her attorney's advice at issue 8and waive
her privilege by merely making a claim for attorney's fees."

110. 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
111. Id. at 229. Vanderbilt was the first court to hold that after Jaffee courts should not
base waiver on a consideration of whether the privilege is relevant or useful. See id.
112. Id at 228,230.
113. Id. at 226.
114. Id. at 230. Although the substance of the communication is privileged, the fact
that such communication took place is not privileged and facts regarding the occurrence of
psychotherapy and the dates of treatment are discoverable. Id.
115. Id. at 229.
116. Id. at 230 (citing Inserra v. Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A., 1995 WL 54402 (D.N.H.
Jan. 31, 1995) (commenting on attorney-client privilege and holding that a privilege
"cannot and should not at once be used as a shield and a sword.")).
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id.
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Following Vanderbilt, the court in Booker v. City of Boston"19
found that a plaintiff only waives her privilege when she makes
affirmative use of the privileged material in her case. 20 The Booker
court denied defendant's motions to compel plaintiff's psychological
records and cited the "exceptionally strong language" that the Jaffee
Court used in rejecting the balancing approach and stressing the need
2
for certainty of the privilege.' '
Booker stressed that the privilege applies only to
'communications' between the plaintiff and her psychotherapist, and
to the "records of such communication.' ' 2 2 The defendant is still able
to question the plaintiff regarding the "fact" of her psychotherapy
treatment and is also able to inquire into the plaintiff's past to show
partially, by
that her emotional distress was caused, at least
3
defendant.12
the
of
acts
circumstances other than the
Following the Vanderbilt rationale, Hucko v. City of Oak
Forest'2 4 adopted a narrow interpretation of the waiver doctrine.'25
However, the Hucko court conceded that a plaintiff who intends to
offer independent expert testimony or evidence of previous
consultations with a therapist has waived the privilege. 2 6 In Hucko,
the plaintiff sued the city as well as individual police officers for
alleged civil rights violations during the plaintiff's arrest. 2 7 The
plaintiff claimed emotional distress but did not intend to offer
medical testimony to affirmatively bolster his claim and, in fact, took
no affirmative steps to place his diagnosis or treatment at issue. 2 8
Like the court in Vanderbilt, the court in Hucko analogized to
the doctrine of waiver in attorney-client privilege cases. Ultimately,
the Hucko court held that the plaintiff here did not waive his
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 29 Hucko compared the doctrine of
implied waiver in attorney-client privilege, under Seventh Circuit law,
to that of psychotherapist-patient privilege to determine whether or
not there was a waiver. 30 The court stressed that this approach is
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

No. 97-CV-12534-MEL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14402 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999).
Id.at *3.
Id.at *2-3, *5 (citingJaffee's rejection of the lower courts' balancing test).
1I at *4.
See idLat *4-5.
1999).
185 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Ill.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 527.
I. at 529.
I.
See id. at 528-29 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

consistent with Jaffee, where the Supreme Court compared the
attorney-client privilege to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and
asserted that the two serve similar interests. 13'
In order to waive the attorney-client privilege, a client must try
to prove a claim or defense by disclosing or describing an attorneyclient communication. 132 Applying this principle, Hucko held that the
plaintiff did not waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege by merely
asserting that the defendant's actions caused him to suffer emotional
harm.

133

Hucko disputed Sarko and other broad waiver cases, which hold
that merely claiming emotional distress damages places a plaintiff's
mental condition at issue.134 The court found that, although those
cases were distinguishable on their facts, "these decisions paint with
too broad a brush in determining waiver."'1 35 Hucko pointed out that
a broad waiver analysis is inconsistent with the doctrine of waiver in
136
attorney-client privilege cases.
The Hucko court distinguished a case where a plaintiff would
"reveal or rely upon medical expert testimony" from cases where a
plaintiff merely claims emotional distress damages. 137 Central to the
court's reasoning here was the fact that plaintiff did not plan to call
his psychotherapist or to-offer independent expert testimony. 138

Next, Hucko attacked the fairness argument often set forth in
broad waiver cases. 139 Many broad waiver courts justify a finding of
waiver because it would be unfair to allow a plaintiff to hide behind a
claim of privilege once she has placed her mental state at issue.140
The Hucko court identified this fairness argument as essentially a
relevance argument. 141 Hucko criticized the relevance argument as
counter to the "very nature of a privilege" which "prevents disclosure
of information that may be relevant in the case, in order to serve
interests that are of over-arching importance.' 42 Hucko concluded
851 (3d Cir. 1994) (considering in detail the scope of the implied waiver doctrine)).
131. Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 528.
132. Id at 529.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 530.
135. 1&
136. Id.
137. Id. at 529.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 530. The defendant in this case also relied on fairness considerations in
arguing that the plaintiff had waived the privilege. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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that using fairness as a consideration violates the Supreme Court's
rejection of a balancing test in Jaffee.143
Following Hucko, the Adams v. Ardcor'44 court held that a
plaintiff who calls a non-treating psychotherapist as an expert witness
to bolster her emotional distress claim has waived the privilege. 45 In
Adams, the court found that "[t]he rationale of Hucko is persuasive
and is consistent with the analytical framework utilized by the
Supreme Court in Jaffee.'1 46 Here, the plaintiff sought compensation
for injuries received at work. His claim included damages for
emotional distress. After examining the two lines of cases, the Adams
court adopted the narrow waiver approach, finding that a plaintiff
does not waive the privilege merely by claiming emotional distress
damages. 147 However, because the plaintiff in this case planned to
call a non-treating psychotherapist as an expert witness to support his
emotional distress claims, the court held that he waived his privilege
as to pre-accident treatment. 148
Similarly, another recent court followed the Hucko approach. In
Ruhlmann v. Ulster County,149 the court held that the plaintiff did not

place his mental state at issue solely by claiming incidental, garden
variety emotional distress damages. 150 The court found that the broad
waiver analysis is inconsistent with the purpose of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 5 ' Like other narrow waiver courts,
the Ruhlmann court examined the purpose of the privilege in finding
that the privilege should not be so easily waived.152
IV. The Post-Jaffee Dilemma
Broad waiver courts force those who are the possible victims of
emotional injury to make a Hobson's choice when pursuing litigation.
Many claimants with any history of psychotherapy must choose
between forfeiting their legal remedy or potentially making public
143. Id.
144. 196 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
145. Id. at 344.
146. See id. (as well as following the Hucko approach, this court adopted the "common
sense approach" of Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D.Ill. 1999)).
147. Adams, 196 F.R.D. at 341-44.
148. Id. at 344.
149. 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
150. Id. at 450-51 (plaintiff who asserted a perceived disability ADA claim against
employer did not place actual mental condition at issue and thus did not waive his
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
151. Id. at 451.
152. Id.
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confidential information that would otherwise remain privileged, in
order to further an emotional distress claim.
A. Broad Versus Narrow Waiver Cases

Narrow waiver cases, like Vanderbilt and Hucko, which find
waiver only where a claimant places the substance of her therapist
communications at issue, are truer to the spirit of Jaffee. These cases
recognize that the privilege is not to be balanced away and should not
be waived lightly.
While carefully guarding a plaintiff's privilege, narrow waiver
courts do not deny defendants the right to examine the events of a
plaintiff's past. In Hucko, the court emphasized that the erosion of
the privilege is not the only way to find the truth.153 The Hucko court
points out that a defendant can still inquire into a plaintiff's past to
154
find other causes for her emotional distress than those alleged.
By contrast, broad waiver courts, like Sarko and Sidor rely on
fairness to the defendant as a justification for finding waiver. These
fairness arguments run counter to the very nature of privilege. In
Jaffee, the Supreme Court held that the protection of confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and a patient was a
strong enough public interest that it outweighed the need for
otherwise probative evidence. 155 Accordingly, a consideration of the
defendant's access to evidence when determining waiver is a
balancing exercise prohibited by Jaffee.
As narrow waiver courts like Hucko argue, the broad waiver
approach is not the only way to construe the privilege fairly for a
defendant. When a plaintiff claims damages for emotional harm that
is within a layperson's sphere of knowledge, her actions should not be
held to have waived the privilege, providing that she is not making
affirmative use of a diagnosis or the substance of her psychotherapy.
Both broad and narrow waiver courts agree that when a plaintiff
intends to call her psychotherapist or a non-treating mental health
expert as a witness, the plaintiff has waived her privilege. Thus, the
outstanding distinction between the two lines of caselaw is whether a
plaintiff waives her privilege solely because she claims emotional
distress damages.
When a plaintiff is merely claiming emotional distress damages,
the testimony of an expert witness or mental health professional is
153. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526,531 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
154. Id.

155. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996).
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not necessary.' 56 If that same plaintiff is not attempting to introduce
the records of her treatment or any evidence of the substance of
communications with any psychotherapist, a finding that she has
placed her mental state at issue and waived her privilege does not
follow. As one commentator argues,
"[ilt is one thing for a party knowingly to waive the privilege in
order to gain the benefit of a therapist's expert testimony on
emotional distress damages; it is quite another for a defendant to be
able to force discovery of confidential patient-therapist
communications whenever an opposing party alleges emotional
distress."'

157

The narrow waiver approach is truer to Jaffee and the only just
way to protect a plaintiff's psychotherapist-patient privilege.
B. The Hobson's Choice

Some assert that "the underlying issues of fairness and justice do
not lend themselves to a bright-line rules of automatic waiver or nonwaiver.' 58 And, perhaps courts should employ a balancing test on a
case-by-case basis. 159 However, the case-by-case approach is in direct
contradiction with the Supreme Court's anti-balancing mandate in
Jaffee. The Supreme Court's fear that privilege would be in the hands
of trial judges who balance the relative interests appears to be
realized when one examines broad waiver cases.
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court's primary concern was
that psychotherapist-patient communications would be chilled in the
absence of a reliable privilege.
The Court recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to lend an aspect of
certainty to the confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient
relationships. Ironically, however, a therapist after Jaffee is well
advised to limit the issues discussed with patients who may be
Given the
involved or potentially involved in litigation.160
156. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing Scope of
FederalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 1, 25 (2000) (observing that
"[a] party who intends to prove emotional distress solely through her own testimony can
be deposed on that subject, and this discovery will be sufficient to prevent unfair surprise
at trial without violating the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship" (citing FED. R.
Civ. PROC. 30(a))).
157. Nelken, supra note 156.
158. West, supra note 53, at 917 (reviewing post-Jaffee cases and concluding that in
spite of the existing inconsistencies, the bulk of these cases "seem to be fairly decided
when viewed within the context of their facts").
159. Id at 919.
160. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman & William Foote, Jaffee v. Redmond's Impact: Life
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inconsistencies regarding waiver in the federal courts, there is little
certainty and therapists must be as cautious as possible.
Unfortunately for patients, it may be that discussing this nowrestricted issue is the most critical aspect in improving a patient's
mental health. This type of restriction frustrates the goal of open
communication between a patient and a therapist and thwarts the
Supreme Court's objective in Jaffee. Like limitations on the privilege,
a privilege that is broadly waived is also contrary to the Supreme
Court's objective in Jaffee. In broad waiver cases, a plaintiff's privacy
interest is in direct conflict with her interest in claiming emotional
damages. In particular, a plaintiff's decision to maintain her privacy
may cost the plaintiff her emotional distress claim.
6 illustrates a plaintiff's dilemma when
Santelli v. Electro-MotiveM
claiming emotional damages in a broad waiver context. 162 In Santelli,
the plaintiff brought a Title VII action for damages resulting from the
defendant employer's alleged sex discrimination and retaliation. 163
Plaintiff initially alleged emotional distress but later narrowed her
claim to damages for humiliation and embarrassment to avoid a
waiver of her privilege. 164 The Santelli court held that the plaintiff's
claim was narrowed successfully to avoid waiver of her
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 165
As a result, however, plaintiff could not introduce any evidence
of conditions or symptoms; her claim was limited to testimony of
humiliation or embarrassment that she felt as a result of the alleged
conduct. 66 The court conceded this case resulted in a "meager
victory" for Ms. Santelli1 67 The court admitted that her case was now
severely limited and "[b]are testimony of humiliation or disgust may
prevent her from fully recovering for her alleged emotional

After the Supreme Court's Recognition of a Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 30 PROF.

PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 479, 485-86 (1999) (discussing the ethical demands of therapists
in the wake of the Jaffee decision).
161. 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
162. Id.; see also Kiermeier v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 1999 WL 759485 (N.D. Ill. Sept.

7, 1999)(advising the parties that, in light of the court's ruling in Santelli, the plaintiff in
this case has a similar option of limiting her emotional distress claim to avoid a waiver of
the privilege).
163. Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 307. Plaintiff claims that she was unlawfully discriminated
against based on her sex when she was denied certain welding positions at the defendant's
factory. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 309.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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distress. ' 168 The Santelli court advised the plaintiff that she might be
better off disclosing her psychological records. 169 However, even
though plaintiff's claim may have been more successful had she relied
on the privileged information, this does not take into account the
emotional upheaval that revealing privileged information might have
caused Ms. Santelli.
V. The Post-Jaffee Challenge to Psychotherapists
Before treatment, an ethical psychotherapist must disclose to the
patient any limits on the confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient
communications. 70 Jaffee has prompted psychotherapists to engage
in more detailed discussions regarding the confidentiality of
communications with patients.171 Before therapy, psychotherapists
should discuss concerns about the impact of potential litigation or
legal involvement, as well as other confidentiality concerns in an
72
informed consent discussion with a patient.
Psychotherapists must anticipate the impact of public disclosure
on the therapeutic process. In certain contexts, therapists may be
well advised to limit the issues discussed in psychotherapy and avoid
173
topics that would prove distressful if discussed publicly.
Admittedly, this is not the "optimal therapeutic strategy."' 74

However, because courts cannot compel information that is unknown
to the therapist, a prudent strategy is to warn clients before discussing
things that may be humiliating if publicly disclosed later. Since
psychotherapists recognize courts as quick to find waiver and other
limits to the scope of the privilege, 7 5 they must prepare patients for
the possibility that privileged information may be subject to broad
waiver.
Conclusion
Narrow waiver courts recognize that Jaffee changed the concept
of waiver by supporting a strong psychotherapist-patient privilege.
These courts will find a waiver of the privilege in a narrow set of
168. Id.
169. Id
170. Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Standard 5.01 (Dec. 1992).
171. Shuman & Foote, supra note 160, at 483.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 485.
174. Id
175. Id at 481.
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circumstances and only when the patient has truly placed the
privileged communications at issue.
Broad waiver cases, on the other hand, rely on the holdings of
pre-Jaffee cases to justify finding waiver of privilege from a mere
assertion of emotional damages. Broad waiver cases violate Jaffee's
no balancing mandate. Jaffee refused to make the psychotherapistpatient privilege contingent on a trial judge's balancing of the
patient's privacy interest against the evidentiary need. This, however,
has been the unfortunate result of the broad waiver approach.
Broad waiver courts, like Sarko and Sidor, fail to recognize the
change in waiver as a result of Jaffee. The facility with which these
courts waive the privilege, combined with the inconsistency among
the federal courts on this issue threatens Jaffee's legacy of certainty in
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

